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LITIGATION AGAINST FRACKING BANS AND
MORATORIUMS IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY
CHRISTOPHER J. HILSON*
A number of U.S. states, counties and municipalities have re-
sponded to the public health and environmental concerns surrounding
fracking by imposing bans or moratoriums on unconventional oil and gas
drilling. These restrictions have, in recent years, given rise to litigation
challenges by oil and gas companies and by property owners deprived of
potential revenues. The current Article begins by examining precisely who
has litigated. Have large companies dominated or is it mostly smaller in-
dependents? Is there a difference in litigation rates between private and
public companies? The Article then considers how Hirschman’s ideas of
exit, voice and loyalty might apply in the context of bans and moratoriums
and further explores some of the factors that may have driven litigation
in the area.
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INTRODUCTION
High volume hydraulic fracturing (“HVHF”) or fracking involves
the injection of large quantities of water under pressure along with
proppants such as sand and other chemicals.1 It is used, together with
horizontal drilling techniques, to extract “unconventional” oil and gas
from shale rock or tight sands.2 The United States has, in the past de-
cade, undergone a “shale revolution”, with a significant industry having
developed across the country, producing enough oil and gas to take it
closer to self-sufficiency3 and with much reduced energy prices.
While industry has extolled the benefits of shale, fracking has
also produced its fair share of controversy. Lax regulatory controls4 have
fed concerns over, inter alia, water and soil contamination by fracking
chemicals or methane, depletion of water resources, local air pollution
from wellbores, compressor stations and site traffic, and climate change
impacts from uncaptured methane. The Gasland documentary, which fa-
mously showed flames coming out of kitchen taps, is regarded by many
detractors as emblematic of the problems associated with the shale boom.5
It is these public concerns that have led to a sizeable number of local com-
munities imposing bans or moratoriums on fracking in their areas.6
Fracking has also given rise to significant private law litigation
by home owners and others who claim to have suffered loss as a result of
the industry’s operations.7 Such claims—across a range of torts including
1 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PRIMER (2009), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/03/f0/Shale
GasPrimer_Online_4-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4TG-ZN7K].
2 Id. at 7–10.
3 U.S. Energy Imports and Exports to come into Balance for First Time since 1950s, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 15, 2015), available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy
/detail.cfm?id=20812 [https://perma.cc/K3D4-9FY3].
4 See, e.g., exemption from the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j(26)
(2012). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 largely excluded hydraulic fracturing from the
former Act’s underground injection control program. Id. § 300h. For this and other exam-
ples, see Katherine Toan, Not Under My Backyard: The Battle Between Colorado and Local
Governments Over Hydraulic Fracturing, 26 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 13–17 (2015).
5 Steve Everley, Debunking Gasland, Part II, ENERGY IN DEPTH (Apr. 25, 2013), available
at http://energyindepth.org/national/debunking-gasland-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/AR3N
-9DH8].
6 See List of Bans Worldwide, KEEP TAP WATER SAFE, http://keeptapwatersafe.org/global
-bans-on-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/S5QG-7H6F] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (listing state
bans and moratoriums).
7 See, e.g., Kaoru Suzuki, The Role of Nuisance in the Developing Common Law of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 265, 265 (2014); Michael Goldman, A Survey of
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trespass and nuisance—have covered a number of different types of alleged
harm, from drinking water contamination to human health impacts of air
pollution.8 However such litigation is not the focus of the current Article.
What it analyzes instead is the litigation brought by the economic actors
on the other side of the debate, who seek to benefit from shale and other
forms of unconventional oil and gas drilling. In particular, it examines
court challenges brought by the oil and gas industry and property owners
against bans and moratoriums on unconventional oil and gas operations
introduced by U.S. local government.
The Article examines who has been bringing litigation against
fracking bans and moratoriums introduced by U.S. states, municipalities
and counties. Where the economic actors involved are oil and gas compa-
nies, it aims to identify what type of company they are. Are they large mul-
tinational “majors”, with integrated operations from upstream (exploration
and production, including drilling), through midstream (transportation,
e.g., via pipelines), to downstream (refining, gas processing, and the sale
of hydrocarbon end products)? Are they large, non-integrated “independ-
ents” (focusing principally on upstream activity) with a national scale?
Or are they predominantly smaller independents operating out of single
states or regional oil and gas fields? Besides firm size and level of vertical
integration, is the model of ownership significant? In other words, is there
a difference between privately owned companies and those whose stock
is publicly listed on a national stock exchange?
As will be seen, the data reveals a particular puzzle, which is that
among oil and gas company litigants, the majority of cases have been
brought by smaller companies. This is puzzling because one might expect
large companies, with greater access to resources, to be better placed to
take on expensive litigation. I argue that rational choice theory can help
to explain this puzzle, and may also assist in understanding some of the
broader recent trends in fracking ban litigation.
Having explored the data on who is litigating, this Article then
investigates the extent to which Albert Hirschman’s typology of exit, voice
and loyalty provides a useful lens on responses by economic actors to
U.S. fracking bans and moratoriums.9 Litigation in this context represents
Typical Claims and Key Defenses Asserted in Recent Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation, 1
TEX. A&M L. REV. 305, 305 (2013); Hilary M. Goldberg et al., It’s A Nuisance: The Future
of Fracking Litigation in The Wake of Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., 33 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
1, 1 (2015).
8 Goldberg et al., supra note 7.
9 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). For an application of Hirschman’s (separate)
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one form of “voice” alongside political campaigning and lobbying; “exit”
to another municipality, county or state without a ban or moratorium
may also be an option for some economic actors; and the Article addi-
tionally explores whether any decision to exercise voice through litiga-
tion rather than to exit may be influenced by loyalty to the relevant
geographical area.
I. FRACKING BANS AND MORATORIUMS
With growing concern on the part of many local communities over
the potential health and environmental risks posed by fracking, the United
States has seen numerous municipalities or counties introduce bans or
more time-limited moratoriums on the practice.10 A limited number of
states such as New York and Vermont have also banned fracking.11 The
precise legal form which these restrictions take varies.12 In some states,
communities have opted for zoning (land use) measures;13 in others they
have employed direct regulatory controls;14 in yet others, bans have been
implemented via community rights charters.15
Because states also regulate the oil and gas industry, where lower
levels of government have introduced such moratoriums and bans, one
is faced with classic issues of subsidiarity, competence and preemption
within a federal system. Which level of government is best placed to reg-
ulate fracking? Is competence exclusive to a particular level, or shared
across levels? Should local democratic choices on the regulation of frack-
ing be allowed to trump state democratic preferences, or, on the contrary,
is local control preempted by state law, either partially or completely? The
anti-fracking movement points to the right of communities to be able to
protect their own health and the local environment. Industry, in contrast,
argues that only state-level control can produce the legal certainty needed
work on rhetoric to fracking, see Ole Pedersen, The Rhetoric of Environmental Reasoning
and Responses as Applied to Fracking, 27 J. ENVTL. L. 325 (2015).
10 List of Bans Worldwide, supra note 6.
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in The Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO.
L. REV. 927, 958–59 (2015).
13 See, e.g., Trinity East Energy, LLC v. City of Dallas, No. DC-14-01443 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
filed Feb. 13, 2014).
14 See, e.g., Citadel Exploration v. San Benito County, No. 15-00028 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Benito Cty. filed March 3, 2015).
15 See, e.g., Bass Energy Inc v. City of Broadview Heights, No. CV-14-828074 (Cuy. Ct.
C.P. March 10, 2015). For more detail on the Charter, see Mothers Against Drilling in
Our Neighborhoods v. Ohio, No. CV-14-836899 (Cuy. Ct. C.P. Dec. 4, 2014).
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for investment and prevent an inefficient patchwork of different rules
emerging.16 Inevitably, this conflict of views has ended up in court, with
industry most often challenging local restrictions on preemption grounds,17
discussed further below (along with other types of challenge).
The United States is not the only country to have seen bans and
moratoriums on fracking. There are numerous instances worldwide, in-
cluding national bans in France and Bulgaria, national moratoriums in
Germany and Scotland, and regional bans in countries such as Spain
and Canada.18 And some of these countries have, similarly, seen industry
litigation challenging such restrictions. Thus in France for example,
Schuepbach Energy19 (unsuccessfully) challenged the 2011 national law
preventing hydraulic fracking.20 However, the United States is unique in
having developed such a significant body of case law in a relatively short
period, which makes it particularly worthy of study.
II. HIRSCHMAN’S EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY
Hirschman’s trilogy of exit, voice and loyalty was developed pri-
marily as a means of explaining how the forces of competition work to
discipline firms and to prevent them from allowing the quality of their
offering to deteriorate.21 While focused on companies, Hirschman empha-
sises that the concepts are also applicable to membership organisations
such as trade unions or political parties.22 For both companies and such
organisations he describes exit and voice as “mechanisms of recuperation”23
from reduced quality.
When confronted by poor quality or service in a competitive market,
a consumer typically has a choice between exiting to another company,
16 Toan, supra note 4.
17 See generally id.; Gregory R. Nearpass & Robert J. Brenner, High Volume Hydraulic
Fracturing and Home Rule: The Struggle for Control, 76 ALB. L. REV. 167 (2013); David B.
Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351 (2014); Jamal Knight
& Bethany Gullman, The Power of State Interest: Preemption of Local Fracking Ordinances
in Home-Rule Cities, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 297 (2015).
18 List of Bans Worldwide, supra note 6.
19 A private, U.S.-headquartered independent oil and gas company with operations globally.
20 See The Conseil Constitutionnel, Schuepbach Energy LLC, No. 2013-346 QPC October 11,
2013 (upholding as constitutional articles 1 and 3 of Law No. 2011-835 of July 13, 2011
on the prevention of the exploration and exploitation of liquid or gas hydrocarbon mines
by hydraulic fracking and revoking exclusive licences to prospect for projects that use
this technique).
21 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 9, at 76–105.
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id. at 5.
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purchasing its product or service instead, or exercising voice within the
existing company. Hirschman describes the latter as follows:
To resort to voice, rather than exit, is for the customer or
member to make an attempt at changing the practices, pol-
icies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or the
organization to which one belongs. Voice is here defined as
any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from,
an objectionable state of affairs.24
However, in a monopoly situation, the exit option is likely to be unavailable,
meaning that only voice is available to dissatisfied customers or members.25
Loyalty to a firm or organisation is described as “a key concept in
the battle between exit and voice.”26 It not only increases the costs of
exit,27 thus making exit less likely, but also increases the likelihood of
voice because people have an attachment and are therefore more likely to
try to achieve change from within.28 Graham and Keeley identify loyalty
as the least understood of Hirschman’s variables.29 They note that while
some see it as a third behavioural response after exit and voice, others re-
gard it as an affective state and therefore as an intermediate variable that
influences the choice between exit and voice.30 They also point out that
while some argue that loyalty increases voice, others claim that silent,
passive loyalty is also a real possibility.31
Hirschman’s schema has been employed in relation to both litiga-
tion and local government decision-making. Thus, with the former, Coffee
has argued that enhancing the potential for “exit” is the best way of improv-
ing accountability to clients in class action suits.32 Literature on the latter
takes inspiration not only from Hirschman but also from Tiebout’s influen-
tial views on competitive federalism, where the possibility of citizen exit
supposedly ensures that local governments remain mindful of the need to
24 Id. at 30.
25 Id. at 33.
26 Id. at 82.
27 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 9, at 80.
28 Id. at 77.
29 Jill W. Graham & Michael Keeley, Hirschman’s Loyalty Construct, 5 EMP’T RESPS. & RTS.
J. 191, 191 (1992).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 John C. Coffee, Jr, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 370 (2000).
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meet citizen preferences.33 Rose argues that accountability for land use
decisions by local government is ensured by paying attention to voice (via
participation) and exit (through predictability).34 Been35 claims that, in
deciding on the degree of judicial scrutiny of local government exactions,36
account should be taken of the ability of developers to exit. Epstein sim-
ilarly analyses Hirschman’s ideas in relation to land use planning,37 but
also looks at local government decision-making more generally.38
However, while Hirschman has been examined in the general
context of local government, his work has not been applied specifically to
fracking. In addition, the above literature is broadly normative in orienta-
tion, employing Hirschman’s typology as a means of assessing the account-
ability of agents to principals, who may be held in check by combinations
of voice and exit. In contrast, the current Article looks to Hirschman’s ideas
of exit, voice and loyalty more as a way of understanding different strate-
gic choices that are available to economic actors in relation to fracking
bans and moratoriums. Litigation as a form of voice is obviously one stra-
tegic option that has been chosen in a number of instances. Exit offers an
alternative strategy to litigation, providing economic actors frustrated by
bans and moratoriums with the ability, in some instances, to move to a
different area. And loyalty, bearing in mind discussion of the concept
above, is regarded, for the purposes of the present Article, as an affective
state that may condition the choice between voice and exit rather than a
third behavioural response or outcome in addition to those two. Following
Hirschman, one might assume that loyalty is more likely to raise the costs
of exit and lead to increased voice.
III. WHAT FORM IS THE LITIGATION INVOLVING BANS AND
MORATORIUMS TAKING?
There are three key potential types of legal challenge to municipal
and county level moratoriums and bans. The first—and the only type to
33 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
416 (1956).
34 Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983).
35 See generally Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991).
36 Financial community payments by developers in return for development permission.
Id. at 474.
37 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 147 (1992) (arguing, inter alia, that Been overstates the value of the exit remedy).
38 Id.
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have produced a significant number of judgments so far—are preemption
claims, arguing that such municipal regulation is unlawful because pre-
empted by state law.39 Such claims typically seek declaratory and/or injunc-
tive relief to have the restrictions lifted. The second are “takings” claims,
which argue that moratoriums or bans are unconstitutional regulatory
takings which violate the owners’ property rights under, in particular,
the Fifth Amendment (or state equivalents).40 The remedy sought here is
damages to reflect the loss caused by the restriction. Restrictions on frack-
ing may now face both types of claim simultaneously, it being considered
that adding in a damages element produces a more powerful challenge:
The WSPA [Western States Petroleum Association] raised
both arguments in its suit against Compton. Observers
have noted that a takings claim brings the added dimen-
sion of a potentially significant verdict against the counties.
Many argue that localities may rescind their fracking bans
rather than risk incurring a large financial obligation.41
Without going into detail on the substantive law on takings,42 the issue
with such claims is likely to be the difficulty of establishing that all of the
economic value of the property has been removed. Economic use of the
surface land in the form of, say, farming, is likely to still be possible;43
and even if the courts view a minerals estate in isolation, then a ban
on fracking will typically not prevent the employment of conventional
well drilling.44
39 See, e.g., Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014); Lenape Res. v. Town
of Avon, No. 14-00102 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 3, 2014); Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town
of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); Colorado Oil & Gas Assoc. v. City of
Lafayette, No. 13CV31746 (Aug. 27, 2014).
40 See, e.g., SWEPI, LP v. Mora County, No. CIV 14-0035 JB/SCY (D.N.M. Jan. 19, 2015)
(also a preemption challenge); Western States Petroleum Assoc. v. City of Compton, No.
BC552272 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cnty. filed July 21, 2014) (also preemption); Trinity East
Energy, LLC v. City of Dallas, No. DC-14-01443 (Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 13, 2014).
41 Barclay Nicholson & Johnjerica Hodge, Fracking Bans May Thrust California Localities
Into Contentious Legal Battle, HYDRAULIC FRACKING BLOG (Nov. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.hydraulicfrackingblog.com/2014/11/fracking-bans-may-thrust-california-local
ities-into-contentious-legal-battle/ [https://perma.cc/LRJ7-HH8B].
42 See generally Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory Takings in the Shale Gas Patch, 19 PA.
ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 193 (2011).
43 Id. at 217–18.
44 Albeit that the leaseholder is likely to argue that alternative drilling operations not
involving fracking will be uneconomic. See Glenn Coin, With Fracking Banned in New
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Third, there have also been electoral law challenges surrounding
municipal ballots introducing bans or moratoriums. For example, Thomas
E. Cave and Broomfield Balanced Energy Coalition v. The City and County
of Broomfield45 saw a challenge to the electoral process introducing the
Broomfield fracking ban. In the event, the court ruled that the city had
substantially complied with state election laws and that the election
should not be set aside.46
While most preemption challenges have been examples of what
Harlow and Rawlings call “proactive” litigation,47 brought by economic
actors as plaintiffs, there are also examples of “reactive” litigation,48 where
a company goes ahead with drilling and waits to be sued as a defendant
for breaching local ordinances. Thus in State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck
Energy Corp.,49 Beck had been granted a state permit to drill (in fact a
conventional well here) and had just started drilling operations. The city
of Monroe Falls then took the company to court claiming that it was
unlawfully drilling in breach of local regulations.50 The Ohio Supreme
Court ruled against Monroe Falls, holding that local licensing controls
were preempted by state regulation of oil and gas drilling.51
Another form of reactive litigation surrounding bans and morato-
riums has involved lease contract renewals or extensions.52 Most of the
relevant minerals lease contracts contain a clause leading to expiry of the
lease if drilling by the minerals lessee (and hence associated royalty pay-
ments to the landowner) has not taken place during a specified period.53
York, What Happens to Landowners, Leases?, SYRACUSE (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www
.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2014/12/fracking_banned_in_new_york_what_happens_to
_landowners_leases.html [https://perma.cc/EYP6-64RC]. Even if there is a ban on all oil
and gas drilling (and not just fracking), private property rights lost under such a ban
must be balanced against savings from potential common law nuisance liability, meaning
that a ban may not be held a taking. McGinley, supra note 42, at 222–34.
45 No. 13CV30313 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2014). See also, e.g., Grafe-Kieklak v. Town of
Sidney, No. 213-602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Del. Cty. Jan. 9, 2014); Beezley & Broomfield
Balanced Energy Coalition v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield, No. 2013CV30304 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 24, 2014).
46 Thomas E. Cave & Broomfield Balanced Energy Coalition v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield,
No. 13CV30313 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2014).
47 See generally CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW (1992).
48 Id. at 83.
49 143 Ohio St.3d 271 (2015).
50 Id. at 272.
51 Id. at 280.
52 See, e.g., Beardslee v. Inflection Energy LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2015);
Beardslee v. Inflection Energy LLC, No. 12-4897 (2d Cir. 2015).
53 Beardslee, No. 12-4897 at 2.
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In New York, a number of oil and gas companies, fearing that the state’s
moratorium would lead to termination through inactivity in this way, ar-
gued that the moratorium amounted to “force majeure”—an unpredictable
situation beyond the company’s control which prevented it from drilling.54
Such a situation meant that the delay imposed by the moratorium should
not count for the purposes of the lease.55 A number of landowners liti-
gated in order to enforce their termination rights under the contracts and
these challenges were typically defended by oil and gas companies trying
to ensure that they did not lose the remaining economic value of the leases
they had purchased. However, the current Article is principally concerned
with an analysis of proactive challenges against bans and moratoriums,
and thus reactive cases like these and the Beck one in the previous para-
graph will not be further considered.
Economic actors have also become involved in litigation against
fracking bans or moratoriums via amicus curiae briefs. In Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth56 for example, an anticipatory challenge was
brought by municipalities to a new state level law on oil and gas (Act 13)
that would effectively prevent municipal home rule of fracking. Local oil
and gas associations (Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association,
the Marcellus Shale Coalition) and a range of companies57 were allowed
to participate as amicus curiae in oral argument in support of the state.
In a mixed ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that elements
of the restrictive state law were unconstitutional, while also underlining
that municipalities could not ban fracking entirely.58 Again, although a
preemption related challenge, not being litigation directly brought by an
economic actor, it is not included in the main data here.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The current Article is a small number (n = 23 legal cases) case
study. Out of what has become a vast range of fracking litigation, the
focus—as already adverted to in the previous section—is on suits brought
by economic actors against fracking bans and moratoriums introduced by
54 Beardslee, 25 N.Y.3d at 150.
55 Id.; see also Anya Litvak, Uncommon Legal Concept May Surface in New York after
Fracking Ban, PITT. POST-GAZ. (Dec. 23, 2014), available at http://powersource.post-gazette
.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2014/12/23/Uncommon-legal-concept-may-surface-in
-New-York-after-fracking-ban/stories/201412230015 [https://perma.cc/4YT7-U5JL].
56 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
57 MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources LLC, Penneco Oil Company Inc, and
Chesapeake Appalachia LLC.
58 Robinson Twshp., 83 A.3d at 901.
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townships, municipalities and states. I include cases which involve what
have been asserted to be de facto bans,59 but I have not covered fracking-
related cases where local government simply denies, for example, zoning
permission to an individual applicant without this being part of a wider
ban or moratorium.60 While the main focus is on fracking bans and morato-
riums, I have included cases challenging bans or moratoriums on wider
oil and gas drilling because these will invariably also rule out fracking. Lit-
igants in such cases may have been intending to employ HVHF; equally,
however, there are some who said they intended to drill only conventional
wells.61 Both have been included. To count as a suit, a case had to have
been filed in court. I did not, therefore, count cases where a pre-action
notice of claim had been served on the relevant local government but no
case had actually been filed.62 The above focus means that the study is
longitudinally self-limiting: such challenges have only occurred within
the last five years or so and most of them are much more recent than that.
The cases involving litigation were identified by searching existing
fracking litigation databases drawn up by some of the key law firms act-
ing in the area,63 which catalogue fracking cases by type, and then by
searching the emerging academic literature on the case law challenging
bans and moratoriums.64 While this builds a fairly complete picture, what
it may not always capture are proceedings that have been filed by compa-
nies but where the relevant municipality has decided to lift the ban rather
than face the significant expense of defending the action.65 I therefore fol-
lowed this up by using internet searches to locate bans and moratoriums
and searching for any litigation against the relevant municipalities or
states which had introduced them. This would also be expected to pick up
59 See, e.g., Trinity East Energy, LLC, No. DC-14-01443.
60 See, e.g., Markwest Liberty Midstream & Res., L.L.C. v. Cecil Twshp. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 102 A.3d 549, 573 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).
61 See, e.g., Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2013).
62 See, e.g., Highland Field & Stream Club, Inc., v. The Town of Highland (filed Oct. 5, 2012).
63 Barclay Nicholson & Norton Rose Fulbright, Analysis of Litigation Involving Shale and
Hydraulic Fracturing (June 1, 2014), available at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com
/files/20140101-analysis-of-litigation-involving-shale-hydraulic-fracturing-104256.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C26J-X9LL]; ARNOLD & PORTER, Hydraulic Fracturing Case Chart (Dec. 2,
2015), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Hydraulic%20Frac
turing%20Case%20Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/293X-A8R9].
64 See, e.g., Nearpass & Brenner, supra note 17; Spence, supra note 17.
65 On this issue of capitulation, see, e.g., Terry Smith, Court Rulings Suggest Athens Frack-
ing Ban is Indefensible, ATHENS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2015), available at http://www.athens
news.com/opinion/wearing_thin/court-rulings-suggest-athens-fracking-ban-is-indefensible
/article_9a4b90e4-ec43-5648-8569-2569d1bb22d3.html [https://perma.cc/N7QG-AKAM].
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very recent cases which the databases may not yet have included. Finally,
I used interviews with industry actors to triangulate my list of cases,
checking that there were no other examples of which the interviewees
were aware. The cut-off period for the purposes of the research was the
end of March 2015.
V. WHO IS LITIGATING AGAINST BANS AND MORATORIUMS?
Before examining the data below, it is worth pointing out that
many of the twenty-three cases involved more than one plaintiff. For data
purposes, if a case involved for example three landowner plaintiffs, these
were counted in Table 1 below as three plaintiffs rather than as a single
example of a landowner case; similarly, if a case involved one landowner,
one oil and gas company and one trade association, it was counted against
all three of these plaintiff types.
Looking at the data to see who is litigating against bans and
moratoriums, it is apparent that it is a mix of oil and gas companies, state
oil and gas trade associations, property owners, state agencies and pri-
vate citizens and citizen groups.
TABLE 1: TYPES OF PLAINTIFF
Type of
Plaintiff
State
Agency
Private
Citizens/
Groups
O& G Trade
Association
O&G
Companies
Landowner
Number
of Suits 2 4 6 14 12
Given the relatively small overall number of cases involved, one should
beware of reading too much into the data. However, bearing that in mind,
by far the greater proportion of claims has been taken by economic inter-
ests and, within these, in particular by oil and gas companies, albeit closely
followed by landowners.
TABLE 2: TYPE OF OIL & GAS COMPANY PLAINTIFF (N=14 FOR EACH OF
SMALL/LARGE, PUBLIC/PRIVATE, LOCAL/NATIONAL)
Type of
Plaintiff
Small
Companies
Large
Companies
Publicly
Listed
Privately
Owned
Local National/
Multi-
national
Number
of Suits 10 4 5 9 9 5
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If one further unpacks the data on suits brought by oil and gas
companies, set out in Table 2, then it can be seen that the majority have
been initiated by smaller companies, most of which are local (state or
regional). Larger companies have been involved as plaintiffs in only four
suits. Of these large companies, one was a subsidiary of a supermajor
(Shell), one was integrated, one was an independent and one was a mid-
stream pipeline infrastructure company.
Just as the difference between small and large companies is
noticeable, with many more suits brought by the former than the latter,
there is also a sharp distinction when one looks at the corporate owner-
ship model. Five suits have been brought by publicly listed companies
owned by shareholders, but nearly twice that number have been insti-
gated by privately owned companies.
VI. EXIT
In discussing exit from an area with a ban or moratorium, it is
important to distinguish between oil and gas companies and property
owners because their potential exit dynamics are different. Beginning
with oil and gas companies, in New York, many—particularly small- and
medium-sized ones—do appear to have exited their unconventional New
York State acreage without litigating:
Mr. Gill contends that the drawn-out nature of state delib-
erations on whether to allow fracking—the process has
been under way for four years—has allowed many land
leases to expire and prompted some companies to walk
away and focus their resources on drilling in other states.
Companies like Talisman Energy and Inflection Energy,
which have drilled with conventional methods in New
York and had hoped to expand into hydraulic fracturing,
have moved operations to Pennsylvania, Mr. Gill said.66
66 Mireya Navarro, Bans and Rules Muddy Prospects for Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, at
A18, Jan. 3, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/nyregion/bans-and
-new-rules-make-gas-drillings-future-uncertain-in-new-york.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc
/A9MK-VKEC]. In Talisman’s case, despite having considerable unconventional acreage
in New York, it was it seems a conscious decision not to litigate. See Litvak, supra note
55, at 34; Daniel Wiessner, NY Unlikely to Face Lawsuits Over Fracking Ban, Experts
Say, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2014) (“Thomas West, an Albany attorney who represents some
of the companies that have left New York, said his clients had taken their investments
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In contrast, subsidiaries of supermajors such as ExxonMobil’s XTO
Energy and Shell’s SWEPI67 appear to have maintained their unconven-
tional New York acreage rather than exited by selling leases or letting
them expire.68 Very large companies like these can afford to let their un-
conventional assets sit idle, playing the long game in a way that smaller
and medium sized firms cannot. That said, Shell has in recent years sold
a significant proportion of its U.S. shale acreage,69 apparently preferring
to focus on more profitable LNG and offshore assets instead.70 In its case
it may simply be that any New York assets it holds are now virtually
worthless in any event which means that no New York acreage sales have
been apparent.
It is worth noting that Hirschman never regarded voice and exit
as mutually exclusive and that is borne out here. There are cases such as
to the more than 30 states that allow fracking.”), available at http://www.reuters.com/ar
ticle/2014/12/18/us-energy-fracking-newyork-lawsuits-idUSKBN0JW04D20141218 [https://
perma.cc/7LDQ-DSQQ].
67 Shell bought a range of Appalachian acreage, including in New York, from East
Resources in 2010 for $4.7 billion. Andrew Maykuth, Shell Pays $4.7B for Marcellus Firm,
PHIL. INQUIR. (May 29, 2010), available at http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special
_packages/inquirer/marcellus-shale/20100529_Shell_pays__4_7B_for_Marcellus_firm.html
[https://perma.cc/VW7V-NWNM].
68 Interview with Karen Moreau, Executive Director NY, American Petroleum Institute
(API). In December 2015, Shell’s website stated that the company maintained acreage
in New York. About Us, SHELL, http://www.shell.us/about-us/projects-and-locations/appa
lachia-pennsylvania.html [https://perma.cc/PZ8A-MAPS] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016). In
September 2014, XTO stated that it held 43,000 acres in its southern tier counties of New
York. Randy J. Cleveland, Policy, Responsibility and People: Leading the Way on Shale,
presented at Shale Insight, MARCELLUS SHALE COALITION (Sept. 24, 2014), available at
http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/news-and-updates/speeches/policy-responsi
bility-and-people-leading-the-way-on-shale [https://perma.cc/P4QF-J9QL].
69 Much of the Appalachian acreage it bought from East Resources was sold in 2014 to
Rex Energy (at a very significant loss). Also in 2014, it sold its Pinedale gas acreage in
Wyoming to Ultra Petroleum and its interest in Haynesville Shale in Louisiana to Vine
Oil and Gas. However, in its deal with Ultra Petroleum it also acquired some acreage in
Pennsylvania. See Anya Litvak, Shell Concentrating its Marcellus Holdings, Sells Off
Other Shale Assets, PITT. POST-GAZ. (Aug. 14, 2014), available at http://powersource.post
-gazette.com/powersource/companies/2014/08/14/Shell-concentrating-its-Marcellus-holdings
-sells-off-other-shale-assets/stories/201408140284 [https://perma.cc/M3LL-TG5X]. It has
also since ‘accidentally’ acquired some Appalachian and other shale assets through its
takeover of BG Group, bought primarily for its assets such as LNG and offshore Brazil.
See Joe Fisher, Shales Barely Mentioned in Shell-BG Group Deal Talk, NAT. GAS INTELL.
(Apr. 8, 2015), available at http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/101915-shales-barely
-mentioned-in-shell-bg-group-deal-talk [https://perma.cc/MR8V-DQHQ].
70 A strategic direction cemented by its takeover of BG Group.
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Anschutz,71 Lenape,72 National Fuel,73 and Norse Energy74 where unsuc-
cessful litigation has led to subsequent exit from the restrictive area. In
Norse’s case, that exit from New York State was effectively a forced exit
via bankruptcy.75
It is also worth observing that exit in terms of unconventional oil
and gas because of blocked opportunities does not necessarily mean an
exit by the business from the area altogether. Thus for example in New
York State, although as noted in the quote above, Talisman exited New
York to take up unconventional opportunities elsewhere, it remains active
in the state for the purposes of its existing conventional76 operations in
the Trenton/Black River area,77 where it has around eighty wells (though
with no new developments). And similarly with Lenape mentioned above,
while it exited the town of Avon in New York State as far as unconven-
tional operations were concerned, it continued with its long-standing con-
ventional wells in the area.78 Production from conventional wells operated
by such companies of course means that their leases remain active for
the purposes of possible future unconventional drilling, should the New
York ban be lifted in the future.
Depending on their ownership category, property owners are likely
to be in a somewhat different position in relation to exit. Many property
owners—particularly those in areas with only a recent history of resource
71 “Anschutz is ‘in the process of selling assets, surrendering leased lands and exiting
New York,’ Brent Temmer, a spokesman for the closely-held company, said in an e-mail.”
Chris Dolmetsch et al., Anti-Fracking Win in N.Y. Court May Deal Blow to Industry,
BLOOMB’G BUS. (June 30, 2014), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2014-06-30/n-y-cities-win-right-to-ban-fracking-oil-industry-loss [https://perma.cc/KL7X
-EL9V]; see also Anschutz Ending Drilling Efforts in New York, DENV. BUS. J. (Dec. 3 2012),
available at http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/morning_call/2012/12/anschutz-ending
-drilling-efforts-in.html [https://perma.cc/77RC-QJ9H].
72 Interview with John Holko, President and owner, Lenape Resources.
73 Litvak, supra note 55.
74 Glenn Coin, Norse Energy Shutting Down U.S. Operations as New York Hydrofracking
Moratorium Continues, SYRACUSE (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index
.ssf/2013/10/norse_energy_were_leaving_new_york_because_we_cant_frack.html [https://
perma.cc/G74X-NMAU].
75 Id.
76 Some of this has involved horizontal drilling, but not fracking. Details on Trenton–
Black River Horizontal Drilling in NY State, MARCELLUS DRILLING NEWS (Nov. 21, 2014),
available at http://marcellusdrilling.com/2014/11/details-on-trenton-black-river-horizontal
-drilling-in-ny-state/ [https://perma.cc/6W8C-5FAU].
77 Litvak, supra note 55.
78 Interview with John Holko, supra note 72.
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exploitation79—will own both the surface land and the minerals estate
associated with it. If they then lease the minerals estate to an oil and gas
company for drilling, then, assuming the well is commercial, they will also
own the royalty interest which entitles them, under the terms of the lease
to royalty payments from the operator on production. These payments
can range from several thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars or
more per year based on the size of the acreage, oil prices, and the negoti-
ation skills of the landowner or their agent.80 Depending on the relevant
state law, surface rights and mineral rights may be divided, and royalty
interests can also be sold separately (i.e., a landowner may choose to keep
the minerals estate but to sell the royalty interests from one or more
wells). What happens with exit is likely to turn on the ownership category
into which a property owner falls. In a more general, non-oil and gas,
property development context, Epstein states of exit that:
It may well be that the developer has options to take the
project elsewhere . . . but it surely does not follow that the
landowner who wishes to sell to the developer has the same
level of mobility or the same level of choices.81
In the current oil and gas context, that is also likely to be true of surface
property owners who own the minerals estate (i.e., where there has been
no division): assuming they live on the property, they are unlikely to be
in the same position to leave the area in the face of a ban as a more mobile
oil and gas company (the latter being more akin to Epstein’s developer).
However, where estates have been divided, then the minerals or royalty
interest owner may well be from outside the area in the first place and
thus for them, exiting is more about seeking better income-producing
opportunities from property elsewhere rather than physically changing
where they live. Of course this assumes they have the funds available and
many may not. In principle a surface property owner might choose to do
the same, staying where they are physically but investing in productive
leases or royalties elsewhere; however again, not all landowners will have
the funds to do so.
79 Timothy W. Kelsey et al., Marcellus Shale: Land Ownership, Local Voice, and the
Distribution of Lease and Royalty Dollars, PENN. STATE UNIV. (July 18, 2012), available
at http://aese.psu.edu/research/centers/cecd [https://perma.cc/648B-47DW].
80 They will also receive a signing on bonus when they sign the lease, the size of which
can, again, vary considerably from thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars.
81 Epstein, supra note 37, at 155.
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VII. VOICE
Although litigation is the main form of voice examined in the
current Article, it is worth noting that voice may also take the form of
campaigning and political lobbying, which has been a key initial strategy
for a number of companies to try to avoid local bans or moratoriums being
passed in the first place. Taking just one example, in California it has
been reported that “A coalition funded by Chevron, ExxonMobil, Occiden-
tal Petroleum and other oil giants donated roughly $2.1 million to the op-
position campaign in San Benito County, outspending supporters 14–1”.82
However, where such efforts fail and bans or moratoriums are intro-
duced by local governments, then one is reasonably likely to see litigation
adopted as an alternative strategy by some economic actors.
Looking at the data on litigation presented earlier, the greatest
puzzle appears to be why it is that smaller companies have greatly out-
weighed larger ones in choosing to litigate. After all, from a resources per-
spective, one might expect litigation to be more the preserve of the larger,
financially better resourced companies, which are also more likely to have
an in-house legal team and to be strategic “repeat players” in Galanter’s83
terms.84 For trade associations to bring cases is no surprise: they are well
resourced and are there to solve what might otherwise be a collective
action problem posed by which company will take on litigation challeng-
ing a ban when other companies will clearly benefit from free riding on
such a challenge. But finding smaller, independent companies taking on
a significant amount of the relevant litigation does seem somewhat sur-
prising (at least relative to larger companies, since even these smaller oil
and gas companies are still typically well resourced).
Rational choice theory may, however, provide us with an answer
to this puzzle. Given that firms are accustomed to thinking in terms of
82 Paul Rogers, Fracking: Oil Company Sues to Overturn San Benito County Fracking
Ban; Could Affect Other Counties, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (March 3, 2015), available
at http://www.mercurynews.com/science/ci_27626990/fracking-oil-company-sues-overturn
-san-benito-county [https://perma.cc/TWQ6-BK2J]. For New York examples, see BRIAN
PAUL & SUSAN LERNER, COMMON CAUSE, DEEP DRILLING, DEEP POCKETS IN NEW YORK
STATE CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND LOBBYING EXPENDITURES BY FRACKING INTERESTS
TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY (2014), available at http://www.commoncause.org/states
/new-york/research-and-reports/NY_011314_Deep_Drilling_Deep_Pockets.pdf.
83 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95, 95 (1974).
84 Isaac Unah, Explaining Corporate Litigation Activity in an Integrated Framework of
Interest Mobilization, 5 BUS. & POL. 65, 65 (2003).
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costs and benefits of different courses of action, one might expect rational
choice to be well suited to explain decision-making in this context. The
decision to litigate involves balancing the financial cost of taking a case
to court against the probability of winning it and the size of the financial
benefit to the plaintiff of overturning a fracking moratorium or ban.85 A
standard rational choice or law and economics assumption is therefore
that a person will litigate where the expected benefits of doing so are
greater than the expected trial costs.86 Where this is the case, an eco-
nomic actor will choose to exercise voice via litigating rather than, for
example, deciding to exit to make use of opportunities in other local gov-
ernment areas without fracking bans or moratoriums.
How then does this enable us to account for the different decisions
taken by small and large companies when it comes to fracking litigation?
After all, in deciding to use litigation as voice, both are confronted by an
inability to exit without significant financial cost. And on one level, the
cost/benefit equation they are faced with appears to be similar: while the
value of leases may be in the many millions, litigation costs are more
likely to be measured in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. A number
of factors may nevertheless help to explain the distinction. It should be
pointed out at the outset that it is not simply a matter of smaller compa-
nies dominating onshore oil and gas exploration involving fracking (in
which case one would expect them to be proportionately more involved
in litigation). The perception has arisen that the industry has been cen-
tered around so-called “mom and pop” companies. However, as Wang and
Xue demonstrate, the actual data does not support this: in fact, a rela-
tively low number of large companies (mostly large independents with a
few integrated companies) is responsible for by far the majority of shale
wells drilled.87 What else might explain the greater involvement of small
operators in litigation therefore? For small firms, their blocked leases are
likely to form a greater proportion of their overall assets. For large com-
panies, in contrast, these leases probably represent only a small propor-
tion of their operations. This means that larger firms can afford to let
those assets drift rather more than small firms can, explaining in part
85 See generally FRANCISCO CABRILLO & SEAN FITZPATRICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COURTS
AND LITIGATION (2008).
86 Id.; Holly J. McCammon, Labor’s Legal Mobilization: Why and When Do Workers File
Unfair Labor Practices?, 28 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 143 (2001); Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation,
in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS VOL. 1 at 259 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007).
87 Zhongmin Wang & Xue Qing, The Market Structure of Shale Gas Drilling in the United
States, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, No. dp-14-31 (2014).
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why the latter may be more inclined to litigate as a result. Next, it is also
likely that large companies will be more inclined to worry about reputa-
tional damage associated with lawsuits than smaller operators and may
prefer instead to allow trade associations to take on proceedings. To ana-
lyse this in rational choice terms, the lost benefits caused by a particular
ban or moratorium are thus lower for a larger company than they are for
a smaller one because they are likely to be more marginal in nature for
the former type of firm. And large companies will also weigh such benefits
against the potential reputational costs of being seen as a Goliath taking
on a small community David.
Rational choice theory can also help to explain changing patterns
of litigation. As noted above, rational choice argues that the decision to
litigate involves balancing the financial cost of taking a case to court
against the probability of winning it and the size of the financial benefit
of a win. A key factor in determining the probability of success is the pre-
vious success of cases. Where preemption victories have been won by oth-
ers in the past, then that is likely to have incentivised further litigation
by economic actors because the probability element is made greater. In
New York State in contrast, a series of demoralising preemption defeats
for economic actors88 may be one reason why fracking litigation rates in
the state have dropped off more recently.89
However, others have suggested that resources, or rather a lack
of them, are behind the slowdown of litigation, not just in New York, but
also nationally.90 Without intervention to cut output by Opec, and with
88 “As Brad Gill, executive director of the Independent Oil & Gas Association of New York,
noted, of the five major lawsuits that have challenged the state moratorium or local bans,
none have gone in favor of oil and gas interests. ‘That was pretty depressing for the
industry,’ he said.” Litvak, supra note 55.
89 Another state-specific reason may be the general decline in oil and gas companies
continuing to operate in the state, with many, as already noted, having exited. However,
property owners typically still remain and litigation is perhaps more likely to come from
them now.
90 “According to lawyers following the local control issue, a solid follow-up case to Munroe
Falls may simply not exist yet. Zoning rules and drilling bans in some other Ohio cities,
including Athens, Yellow Springs and Mansfield, have not faced industry challenges yet.
And the collapse in oil prices means less industry fuel for challenges in those locales,
which are not considered prime shale territory anyway, said BakerHostetler attorney
Marty Booher.” Ellen M. Gilmer & Mike Lee, Ohio Towns Play Wait-and-See in Wake of
Drilling Ruling, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (March 10, 2015), available at http://midwest
energynews.com/2015/03/10/ohio-towns-play-wait-and-see-in-wake-of-drilling-ruling/
[https://perma.cc/32B4-WTL4]; see also Wiessner, supra note 66 (“When Governor Andrew
Cuomo announced a ban on fracking in New York on Wednesday, he predicted ‘a ton of
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a glut of supply from U.S. shale producers, energy prices tumbled in the
latter half of 2014 and remained at low levels in 2015 and into 2016. With
oil and gas prices at such lows and with the industry globally engaging in
significant cost cutting as a result, expensive preemption litigation de-
signed to free up costly investment in new drilling is now more likely to
be regarded as an unnecessary luxury. Whether the same can be said of
takings claims is slightly less clear: some property owners and oil and
gas companies might now be tempted by the potential of a large damages
claim; however, the dual uncertainty of the likely doctrinal success of such
claims and, even if successful, of the potential for actually recovering sig-
nificant sums from less well-off (and in a number of cases very small) local
governments will undoubtedly put off many others.
From a rational choice perspective, the above in fact involves not
only resources—which translate into the costs of litigation appearing
higher because these will represent a greater proportion of overall com-
pany expenditure than during boom times—but also decreased likely ben-
efits from winning a preemption challenge. With the latter, the benefits
to be had from drilling wells are much lower in an era of low prices for oil
and gas. And as for takings claims, there, the size of the benefits pot may
be high, but the probability element is low, both in terms of doctrinal un-
certainty and in terms of the likelihood of actually getting any damages
award paid in the end.
Ideology also appears to have played a part in some lawsuits,
although its precise role is hard to gauge. In Vermillion v. Mora County91
for example, the plaintiffs’ case was supported by the Mountain States
Legal Foundation (“MSLF”), which describes itself as “a nonprofit, public-
interest legal foundation dedicated to individual liberty, the right to own
and use property, limited and ethical government, and the free enterprise
system.”92 Because of the nature of the MSLF’s mission, this case might be
seen as an example of ideologically driven litigation, with the case’s fund-
ing reflecting an ideological desire to uphold constitutional property rights.
There are also other landowner cases where litigants have explained their
decision to litigate in terms of seeking to protect their private property
rights from municipal diktat. In Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of
lawsuits’ against the state. But that is unlikely as the end of a drilling boom has left the
industry in no mood for a fight, industry experts and lawyers said.”).
91 No. 1:13-cv-01095 (New Mex. Dist. Ct., filed Nov. 11, 2013).
92 Mountain States Legal Homepage, MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL, https://www.mountain
stateslegal.org/ [https://perma.cc/N74T-MCPF].
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Middlefield93 for example, the litigant Jennifer Huntingdon claimed that
“She . . . wanted to stand up for landowners rights. Property owners,
Jennifer explained, secured the land from the center of the earth up to
the sky when they bought their land and, as she notes, who are five town
officials to say what they can and cannot do with the resource they right-
fully own?”94 Similarly, in Grafe-Kieklak v. Town of Sidney,95 one of the
litigants, Inge Grafe-Kieklak also underlined the importance of property
rights in a number of media articles and interviews associated with the
case.96 Nevertheless, a note of caution is warranted. In the case of litigants
who stand to make money from their land if fracking is allowed to proceed,
it is difficult to separate out a purely ideological view on private property
rights from the financial rewards to which unimpeded property rights
would give rise.
VIII. LOYALTY
While larger multinational or national-scale companies are unlikely
to feel a sense of loyalty to a particular state, county or municipality, one
might hypothesise that smaller companies and surface property owners
could be swayed by loyalty to remain and exercise voice rather than simply
exiting as the first option. As we have seen, the data on who has litigated
reveals that, among oil and gas companies, by far the greater proportion
of lawsuits against bans and moratoriums has been instigated by smaller,
local firms. Such companies will often have a close association with the
locality: they will typically have drilling operations solely focused on one
state and may also have long histories of drilling in particular municipal-
ities. This is often mentioned on the “about us” sections of their corporate
websites.97 For companies whose very identity is tied in with particular
93 Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div.
2013).
94 Rachael Bunzey, A Brave Natural Gas Fight in Middlefield, Energy in Depth (Nov. 21,
2012), available at http://energyindepth.org/marcellus/a-brave-natural-gas-fight-in-middle
field/ [https://perma.cc/H42B-T76Y].
95 Grafe-Kieklak v. Town of Sidney, No. 213-602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Del. Cty. Jan. 9, 2014).
96 See, e.g., Inge Grafe-Kieklak, Gasland Part II Leaves Landowners Out on the Streets,
ENERGY IN DEPTH (May 1, 2013), http://energyindepth.org/marcellus/gasland-part-2
-leaves-landowners-out-on-the-streets/ [https://perma.cc/ZC5P-QE2T]; John Kehoe, As
New York’s Gas Potential Evaporates, Locals Despair, BRW (Jan. 16 2015), http://www
.brw.com.au/p/national/as_new_york_gas_potential_evaporates_tr9E1Hm3VPSHFimuy
4YoFP [https://perma.cc/VA9C-TH9C].
97 See, e.g., Four Generations, CITADEL EXPLORATION, http://citadelexploration.com/four
-generations/ [https://perma.cc/CY4E-T7YS] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016); Bass Energy Co.
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geographies, one might suppose that loyalty to place would mean that
exiting to try opportunities elsewhere is far from ideal, even if it might
make economic sense on paper; and that this would make them lean more
towards litigation. However in interview, loyalty did not really register.
In the case of one small company litigant, there was a degree of loyalty
expressed towards those in the community who had supported the com-
pany in its fight, but no sense in which loyalty had led to a decision to liti-
gate rather than to exit. Trade association interviewees expressed similar
scepticism towards loyalty as a factor in explaining a turn to litigation.
With property owners, matters are more complicated. In the case
of litigating property owners, most litigants in the case law were surface
owners living in the area as well as owners of the minerals estate. In some
cases, a degree of what might appear to be loyalty to place was very much
verbalised by these surface owners. In Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v.
Town of Middlefield98 for example, the litigant was a farmer, Jennifer
Huntingdon, who commented on her longstanding connections with the
area and her desire to continue with these into the future:
Coming from a long line of dairy farmers, Huntington said
she continues the farm’s history of concern for family, in-
dustry and community while creating a safe food product.
Responsibility to the environment has been a long-time ef-
fort of the farm, she said . . . . Many of us have been here
for generations and want to pass the land to the next gen-
eration. We want to preserve our way of life.99
However, loyalty arguably implies the ability to exit, but a decision to
remain despite this ability. In the case of landowners living in a particu-
lar area—and particularly a farmer whose family has farmed there for
generations—an ability to exit may be there but only really as a remote
possibility. What keeps people from moving house or farm may not be loy-
alty but rather inertia or lack of choice: moving is difficult and the oppor-
tunity to do so in terms of resources and family circumstances is not
available to all. In other words, rather than loyalty, one might just as well
Homepage, BASS ENERGY, http://bassenergyco.com/ [https://perma.cc/E2P5-WKQU] (last
visited Mar. 27, 2016).
98 Cooperstown Holstein Corp., 964 N.Y.S.2d.
99 Marjorie Struckle, A Question of Property Rights, LANCASTER FARMING (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://www.lancasterfarming.com/news/northern_edition/a-question-of-property-rights
/article_955a64a8-3b1c-58ff-a61e-59c2ad41ae6f.html [https://perma.cc/B5QE-ZU3A].
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say that it is inertia or an inability to exit easily that is more likely to
lead to litigation.
It is therefore tempting to argue, in the case of small local oil and
gas companies and resident landowners, that it is loyalty to place which
makes them apparently more inclined to exercise voice via litigation: be-
cause they are locally based and because they have litigated rather than
exited, it would be easy to conclude that this is evidence of a place-based
loyalty. However, in reality, loyalty here is functioning more as an ex post
label than something which helps one to explain a turn to litigation.100
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have investigated what Hirschman’s famous exit,
voice and loyalty schema might contribute to our understanding of the
responses of economic actors to bans and moratoriums on fracking. One
clear contribution is in highlighting the existence of exit as a real strategic
alternative to litigation for many such actors. In addition, Hirschman’s
account is often characterised as involving a tension between the market
and politics, with exit representing the former and voice the latter. How-
ever, the current Article has shown that litigation can also represent a
form of voice: politics must therefore be viewed broadly so as to include law
and legal strategies alongside more traditional political avenues like cam-
paigning and lobbying. In the end, however, the idea of loyalty seemed to
possess less traction in relation to litigation than it perhaps possessed in
the original consumer quality context that Hirschman was studying.
Regarding loyalty, it was hypothesised that loyalty to a locality or
region may help to explain the puzzle of why small oil and gas companies
and surface landowners have been involved in the majority of lawsuits
against fracking bans and moratoriums. In the event, however, there was
little evidence to support this in the case of oil and gas companies. And
while there was some evidence of loyalty framing in the case of surface
landowners, this was not particularly explicit. But more than that, inso-
far as loyalty connotes non-exit, it also implies a relatively straightforward
100 This very much chimes with the criticisms of Hirschman’s concept of loyalty offered
by authors such as Brian Barry and Michael Laver: that it is an outcome and a post hoc
equation filler rather than a theoretical variable with predictive or explanatory power.
Brian Barry, Review Article: “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,” 4 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 79, 79 (1974);
Michael Laver, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” Revisited: The Strategic Production and Con-
sumption of Public and Private Goods, 6 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 463, 463 (1976).
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ability to exit coupled with a conscious choice not to do so. With surface
landowners, this requirement, necessary for loyalty to meaningfully apply,
was typically absent: in many instances, exiting just was not a real option.
Hirschman thus provides something of a mixed picture. On the one hand,
for economic actors, exit is a potential strategic alterative to litigation.
And it is instructive to conceive of litigation as a form of voice. But, on the
other, loyalty has proved rather less useful as a concept here.
While loyalty was unable to solve the puzzle of the preponderance
of smaller company plaintiffs in fracking litigation, rational choice theory
did seem to unlock the puzzle. Small and large companies may both be
staring at losses running into many millions of dollars as a result of bans
and moratoriums. Nevertheless, the benefits of litigating are less marked
for large companies for whom those many millions will be more marginal
in terms of their overall operations; such companies must also balance
these benefits against reputational costs that may arise from becoming
involved in divisive litigation claims.
